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TRANSPORTATION LAW - Urban Mass Transportation Act
- The Absence of Statutory Provisions Relating to Standing
and Judicial Review Does Not Preclude a Claimant From Seek-
ing Relief in Federal Court. Bradford School Bus Transit, Inc. v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 537 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 797 (1977).
In June 1974 the Urban Mass Transportation Administration
(UMTA) executed a grant-in-aid contract with the Chicago Transit
Authority (CTA) to fund the purchase of buses, rapid transit cars
and other equipment.' Pursuant to section 1602(a) of the Urban
Mass Transportation Act (Act),' CTA agreed to a condition which
prohibited it from engaging in school bus operations in competition
with existing private bus lines. Thereafter, in contravention of this
condition, CTA submitted a bid to provide student transportation
for the Chicago Board of Education. The bid was accepted in Janu-
ary 1975.1
Plaintiff private bus company sought a declaration that CTA was
engaged in school bus operations in violation of section 1602.1 Plain-
tiff also sought to enjoin further UMTA funding of CTA.5 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
declared that plaintiff lacked standing to sue under the Act and
dismissed the complaint.' The court also concluded that UMTA's
action was not subject to judicial review.7
The Seventh Circuit8 held plaintiff had sufficient standing to sue
under the Act. It concluded that plaintiff had adequately alleged an
1. Bradford School Bus Transit, Inc. v. Chicago Transit Auth., 537 F.2d 943, 944 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 797 (1977).
2. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-09 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Act].
49 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (Supp. V, 1975) provides:
No Federal financial assistance shall be provided under this chapter for the con-
struction or operation of facilities and equipment for use in providing public mass
transportation service to any applicant for such assistance unless such applicant and
the Secretary shall have first entered into an agreement that such applicant will not
engage in school bus operations, exclusively for the transportation of students and
school personnel, in competition with private schoolbus operators.
3. 537 F.2d at 945.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 537 F.2d at 943.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
unjust injury due to agency action,' and had sufficiently demon-
strated that its interests were protected by the Act's relevant provi-
sions. 0 In addition, the court of appeals stated that the absence of
a provision for judicial review of agency action did not preclude such
a review of UMTA decisions." Nevertheless, it refused to review the
administrative action because complaint procedures and remedies"
were available and plaintiff was required to exhaust those adminis-
trative remedies. 3
The doctrines of standing and nonreviewability of administrative
actions have been important defenses to legal actions against fed-
eral agencies involved in the operations of mass transit. When a
court finds that a plaintiff does not have standing, it must dismiss
that action for lack of jurisdiction or a justiciable question. When
it finds an agency decision nonreviewable, the court cannot reach
the merits of the case. 5
A purpose of the standing doctrine is to prevent the federal courts
from being used as a forum for the airing of "generalized griev-
ances about the conduct of government."' 6 The doctrine, which
9. Id. at 943-46.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 947.
12. Id. at 948 n.3. 49 C.F.R. §§ 605.30-.35 (1976). The procedures require that the com-
plaint be in writing and specify in detail the alleged violation of the Act. Id. § 605.30. The
funded party must then respond by producing rebutting evidence. Id. § 605.32. Most impor-
tant from a judicial standpoint, the UMTA, after concluding its inverstigation, is required
to include an explanation and analysis of its findings in writing. Id. § 605.33(a).
13. 537 F.2d at 948.
14. See South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir.
1969); Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968); Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012
(E.D. Wis. 1975); Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also Thomas,
Legal Compliance with Laws and Regulations Affecting Mass Transit Operations, 52 J. URB.
L. 835 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Thomas], which discusses the difficulty plaintiffs have
faced in getting courts to recognize their right to standing and their right to judicial review
as well as other legal problems with the conduct of the grant-in-aid and loan programs of the
Act.
15. Harrison Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing & Home Finance Agency, 310
F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962). See also Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). One commentator contends that this has resulted in situa-
tions where "no matter what the constitutional and statutory violations, no matter how
arbitrary and illegal the official action, and no matter how severe the injury to the plaintiffs,
the court in the name of lack of standing refuses to consider the merits!" Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 601, 623 (1968).
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
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stems from the article III'F "case or controversy" mandate imposed
upon the federal judiciary, insures that disputes will be presented
in an adversarial context capable of judicial resolution.', Article III
requires a plaintiff to allege that the government action in question
has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. 9 But when a
party bases a claim upon the provisions of a specific statute, the
issue becomes whether that party's interest is "within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . ... -1
A plaintiff whose interest is protected by a statute is entitled to
seek judicial review of an injury to that interest; but absent that
statutory concern, a plaintiff is not so entitled even if he has suffered
actual injury as a result of governmental action." In the past, claim-
ants have had difficulty suing under the Act because it contains no
express provision conferring standing on any particular person or
group. Courts have interpreted the absence of an express provision
as implying that Congress has denied standing to any group or
person."2 This restrictive interpretation has continued in spite of the
Supreme Court's decision in Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v, Camp,3 where the Court held that legislation, which is not
explicit in protecting an identifiable group, is not presumed to pre-
clude plaintiffs from seeking vindication of their rights in federal
court. 4
In South Suburban Safeway Lines v. City of Chicago," defen-
dants City of Chicago and CTA were constructing a rapid transit
system along the median strip of a major expressway. Defendants
Department of Housing and Urban Development and UMTA had
approved a grant to CTA to facilitate the construction. Plaintiff
17. U.S. CONST., art. III, §2, cl. 1, provides: "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .
18. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 181 (1968).
19. Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
20. Id. at 153.
21. Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968). See Jaffe, Standing Again,
84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe].
22. South Suburban Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 285 F. Supp. 676, 678 (N.D. 11. 1968),
aff'd, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969).
23. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
24. Id. at 157. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CI. L. REV. 450 (1970);
Jaffe, supra note 21 at 633.
25. 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969).
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private bus line alleged that the proposed CTA service would com-
pete with and destroy its operation. Thus, it claimed a deprivation
of property without compensation. 6 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed plaintiff's ac-
tion for lack of standing.27
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.28 The court concluded
plaintiff lacked standing as a federal taxpayer, citing Frothingham
v. Mellon 29 and Flast v. Cohen.30 The court also noted that section
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 3' did not apply.
That section provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial re-
view thereof. ' 32 Although it appeared that defendant's actions
would adversely affect plaintiff's operation the court found that
plaintiff had not alleged an invasion of a recognized legal right,
33
and thus it was not a member of a class protected "within the
meaning of a relevant statute."' 3' The court reasoned that plaintiff
could not claim protection under any provision of the Act, 3 because
26. Id. at 536.
27. 285 F. Supp. at 678.
28. 416 F.2d at 537.
29. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Frothingham was a suit brought challenging the constitutionality
of an act to provide funds to states to reduce infant mortality. The Court held that a suit by
a taxpayer may not be entertained to enjoin the enforcement of an appropriations statute.
30. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Flast the Supreme Court granted standing to taxpayers to
challenge the constitutionality of expenditures specifically prohibited under a provision of the
Constitution.
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970)[hereinafter cited as APA].
32. Id. § 702.
33. 416 F.2d at 537. Beginning with Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968),
and followed by Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), the Supreme Court abandoned previous concepts of
the law of standing which were based on a series of seemingly contradictory cases. These cases
held that a person was not entitled to standing unless the right violated was a private,
substantially protected interest. Specifically, a plaintiff would have to do more than merely
allege economic injury. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); FCC v. San-
ders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S.
118 (1939). South Suburban based its holding on language from Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA,
which held that a person injured by governmental action may not challenge that action
"unless the right invaded is a legal right, - one of property, one arising out of contract, one
protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."
306 U.S. at 137-38.
34. 416 F.2d at 537, quoting APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
35. Id.
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the type of competition alleged was not prohibited by section 1602.36
While section 1602 expressed a legislative concern that preexisting
private mass transit systems should be dealt with fairly,37 the Sev-
enth Circuit could find no legislative intent in section 1602(c) 5 to
support plaintiff's claim that its interests as a private transit facility
were protected under the statute. Thus, the South Suburban deci-
sion seemed to compel the plaintiff to identify its interest as one
explicitly protected under the Act regardless of the degree of its
injury.
In Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe," plaintiff bidder sought to enjoin local
transportation authorities from awarding contracts to supply rail-
road commuter cars to defendant electric company. The bidder also
sought to prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from approving
the contract awards." Plaintiff contended that defendant electric
company had not complied with bidding specifications in the invita-
tion to bid. Therefore, it claimed to be the lowest responsive bidder
and argued that the UMTA concurrence in the contract awards
rendered it a party aggrieved by federal agency action.2
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania acknowledged that plaintiff had been "adversely affected"
by agency action. However, the court denied standing to plaintiff,
since its claim was not within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute in question."3 Plaintiff had complained
as a disappointed bidder seeking redress under the Act, but it could
not point to any express or implied legislative concern to protect
these interests. The Act merely outlined the procedures to be used
in the absence of any bidding." Therefore, plaintiff could not rely
36. Id. at 539.
37. 49 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1970) provides:
No financial assistance shall be provided . . . for the purpose of. . . acquiring any
interest in, or purchasing any facilities. . . of, a private mass transportation company
• . . or for the purpose of providing any contract. . . for the operation of mass trans-
portation facilities . . . in competition with . . . the service provided by an existing
mass transportation company . ...
38. Id. § 1602(c).
39. 416 F.2d at 538.
40. 337 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
41. Id. at 435.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 440.
44. 49 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (1970).
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on this language as a basis for standing under the Act.
The district court assumed that a bidder who is unable to point
to legislation providing for the protection of his competitive inter-
ests is without a protectable interest and thus without standing to
sue. But the Supreme Court has granted bidders standing to chal-
lenge administrative action despite the absence of an explicit legis-
lative purpose to protect a competitive interest."5 Moreover, other
courts have been moving toward recognizing an expanded class of
persons entitled to sue under the Act.
In Bartels v. Biernat," "mobility handicapped persons," brought
a class action to prevent the execution and funding of contracts
until the plaintiffs' needs were given greater consideration pursuant
to the Act. 7 Section 1612 of the statute provides that special efforts
must be made in the planning and design of mass transit facilities
so that they are accessible to handicapped persons. 8 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin had little
difficulty in recognizing the plaintiffs' standing to sue. It found that
plaintiffs were, under a literal reading of section 1612, "within the
zone of interests to be protected by the [Act] .""
Bartels is distinguishable from South Suburban. Bartels involved
section 1612(a) of the Act, which provides that handicapped persons
are protected. South Suburban was brought under section 1609(a)
which is not explicit in articulating a legislative concern for existing
private transit facilities. Nonetheless, the court's reasoning in
Bartels represents a progression in expanding the list of proper
plaintiffs under the Act. This progression culminated in the instant
decision.
In Bradford, the Seventh Circuit overruled South Suburban and
abandoned its previous policy of denying standing under the Act. °
Writing for the majority, Judge Robert A. Sprecher recognized the
general trend towards expanding the class of aggrieved persons who
45. See United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953); Alton R.R. v. United
States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
46. 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
47. 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1970).
48. 405 F. Supp. at 1016.
49. Id.
50. 537 F.2d at 945. The court dismissed the district court's reliance upon the decision in
South Suburban as being "misplaced." Id.
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may protest administrative actions.' Adhering to the Supreme
Court's two-pronged test for standing," the court found that plain-
tiffs had: (1) claimed a sufficient injury in fact due to agency ac-
tion;53 and (2) as private bus operators, fell within the zone of inter-
ests protected by the Act." Contrary to prior holdings, the court
held that the provisions of the Act prohibiting competition with
existing private facilities indicated a legislative intent to protect
interested parties from the adverse effects of violations of these
provisions.55
Although Bradford does not represent a pioneering trend of con-
ferring standing upon anyone adversely affected by UMTA action,
it does align the Seventh Circuit with the latest trend in the law of
standing as pronounced by the Supreme Court.56 Persons injured by
UMTA action must establish that they are members of a class pro-
tected by the Act.5 Bradford liberalized the reading of the statute
by expanding the zone of interests to be protected. Under this read-
ing, a disappointed bidder would still be denied standing since its
interest is not expressly mentioned, but operators of preexisting
private transit facilities and handicapped and elderly persons alleg-
ing injury by a UMTA grant-in-aid would be granted standing."
Bradford also addressed the issue of the right to judicial review
of administrative actions. Together with the concept of standing,
this doctrine had provided the UMTA with a defense to suits under
the Act. Although the Act does not expressly provide for judicial
51. Id. at 946.
52. Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), involved an
association of data processors challenging a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency which
allowed national banks to make data processing services available to their banks and bank
customers. The Court held that plaintiffs had standing since undoubtedly the ruling was
going to affect adversely their business. Id. at 154.
53. 537 F.2d at 946.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See notes 33, 52 supra.
57. 537 F.2d at 946. The court declared that plaintiffs represented the only parties pro-
tected by the relevant provisions of the statute. Id.
58. The court in Bradford interpreted the proscription of competition with private school
bus operators contained in 49 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (Supp. V, 1975). In South Suburban, the court
dealt with the prohibition on providing funds to facilities competing with any existing transit
company. 416 F.2d at 536. See 49 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1970). There is no reason to believe,
however, that under the liberal interpretation of Bradford, the decision would not have
resulted in a similar holding. Both provisions are nearly identical in wording and scope.
1977]
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review,59 it does not expressly preclude it."
The APA makes agency action reviewable "except to the extent
that - (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."'" Nevertheless, there has
been a reluctance in the courts to find any broad right to judicial
review for suits brought under the Act." The court in Pullman had
established the criteria to determine whether a particular agency
decision is sufficiently committed to agency discretion so as to pre-
clude judicial review. 3 That court concluded that Congress drafted
the Act in broad concepts rather than specific guidelines"4 thereby
granting UMTA the authority to fulfill the broad congressional pur-
poses of the statute "on such terms and conditions as it may pre-
scribe."" Determination of a plaintiff's cause of action required the
discretion and expertise specially possessed by the UMTA,16 leaving
only the question of abuse to the court's review. 7
Although the Pullman court refused to review the UMTA's exer-
cise of discretion, it conceded that the agency's broad discretion is
limited in some undefined way to five special areas by express provi-
sions in the Act. 8 These provisions concern: (1) competition with
private enterprises;69 (2) relocation of displaced persons;"0 (3) coordi-
59. 337 F. Supp. at 436.
60. 537 F.2d at 947.
61. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). The Supreme Court, acknowledging committee hearings, has
stated that it is unlikely that a statute will expressly withhold judicial review unless a
congressional intent to withhold such review is shown. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232
(1953).
62. See South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir.
1969); Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
63. 337 F. Supp. at 436.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 438.
66. Id. The court found UMTA authorized by the Act to determine the legal, financial
and technical capacities of the applicant to carry out satisfactorily the project. Id. It is also
within the province of the UMTA to tie the grants to the federal standards to fulfill the broad
scheme of uniformity in the program. Id. at 438-39.
67. Id. at 439. The court refused to decide if the defendant conformed to the specifica-
tions. The court held that this type of technical inquiry was precisely the kind of question
that courts should defer to the expertise of the appropriate agency. Id.
68. Id. at 437.
69. 49 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1970).
70. Id. § 1606 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
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nation of transportation systems;7' (4) labor standards;72 and (5)
environmental protection.
Two cases, Kendler v. Wirtz7' and South Suburban Safeway Lines
v. City of Chicago,7 refused to permit judicial review and commit-
ted the questions of labor standards7 and competition with private
facilities" to agency discretion. In Kendler, employees of the Penn-
sylvania Railroad challenged a proposed railroad improvement plan
which would be funded by the UMTA.7 ' Believing their jobs to be
in jeopardy, they sued to enjoin the Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development7 from certifying that
the "fair and equitable" arrangements required by section 1609 of
the Act"' had been made.
The Third Circuit noted that achievement of the broad statutory
policies8' of providing "fair and equitable" safeguards against possi-
ble loss of employment were committed to agency discretion.2 The
accommodation of diverse, competing interests required a delicate
balancing of social and economic concerns that the UMTA was best
suited to perform."1 The provision's concern was the reasonable ac-
commodation of these various unavoidable conflicting interests.
Therefore, Congress intended to leave the determination of what
was "fair and equitable" to the sole judgment of the Secretary of
Labor.'
In South Suburban, the Seventh Circuit recognized the congres-
sional concern over the public acquisition of private facilities with
UMTA funds. But the court failed to find a need for judicial re-
71. Id. § 1603(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
72. Id. § 1609 (1970).
73. Id. § 1610.
74. 388 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968).
75. 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969).
76. 388 F.2d at 384.
77. 416 F.2d at 538.
78. See 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
79. 388 F.2d at 383.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 384.
84. Id.
85. 416 F.2d 535.
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view, 6 because the agency had complied with the provisions of sec-
tion 1602.7 Therefore, the court concluded that the UMTA could
not have abused its discretion.88
The Seventh Circuit in Bradford greatly modified the line of rea-
soning exemplified in South Suburban and Pullman."s The Bradford
court recognized its ultimate power to review UMTA actions.
Thus, it rejected the district court's holding which precluded judi-
cial review." Unable to isolate a specific and explicit legislative
provision granting judicial review, the court found that such intent
was inchoate in the Act. 2 Bradford concluded that the right to
judicial review is the rule rather than the exception; consequently,
it required the defendant to show a clear legislative intent which
excluded the plaintiff from the statute's protection. 3 Only with
clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent would
it restrict access to judicial review of administrative action.
Bradford greatly expanded the scope of judicial review under the
Act. Prior to Bradford, the courts recognized decisional finality as
resting with the UMTA, and were reluctant to look beyond the
threshold question of whether the agency had committed a clear
abuse of discretion. 4 Bradford not only undermined nonreviewa-
bility as a defense, but it also allowed the courts to do more than
determine whether an agency action was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable .5
86. Id. at 539-40. The court held that a reading of the statute revealed a primary concern
over the possibility of public acquisition of private facilities with agency funds and not the
competition with and supplementation of existing facilities as plaintiff claimed. Id.
87. Id. at 538-40.
88. Id. at 538. The court held that each standard calls for an administrative decision
which is ultimately an exercise of descretion. Id.
89. 537 F.2d at 945.
90. Id. at 947.
91. Id. The district court concluded that the aid applicants had to enter into a noncompet-
tive agreement according to the provisions of the Act.
92. Id.
93. Id., citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
94. Thomas, supra note 14, at 841.
95. 537 F.2d at 947. The court rejected the district court's inference of unreviewability
because of UMTA's discretion with respect to breaches of contract. Id. But see McDonald v.
Stockton Metropolitan Transit, 36 Cal. App. 3d 436, 111 Cal. Rptr. 637 (Ct. App. 1974). In
McDonald a suit was brought by bus riders to compel the local transit district to install bus
shelters with UMTA funds according to the provisions of the agreement. The court held that
it was the sole authority of the Secretary to bring suits to enforce compliance under the Act.
Id.
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Nevertheless, the court in Bradford refrained from ruling on the
merits of the case. 6 Noting the complaint procedures which the
agency had established after the initiation of the suit, the court
dismissed the plaintiff's action for its failure to exhaust these ad-
ministrative remedies. It recognized that the resolution of issues
was under the special competence of an administrative body. 8
The UMTA complaint procedures 9 cited in Bradford allow
UMTA to remedy violations of federal standards in the grant-in-aid
program. The court concluded that the purpose of the Act is the
coordination of mass transit systems. Consequently, the particular
expertise of the UMTA should be utilized before submitting the
merits to a court.'"0 Without its newly mandated investigative pro-
cedures and written determinations, a reviewing court would face
complex examinations of fact and law. 0'
Bradford ultimately stands for the right of plaintiffs to seek re-
dress in the courts when wronged by administrative action. It places
the Seventh Circuit squarely in line with the Supreme Court's latest
attempts at defining a manageable law of standing. 02 Parties may
gain vindication of their rights under the Act alleging little more
than injury in fact. Moreover, plaintiffs will not be denied standing
because Congress has failed to provide specific identification of pro-
tected parties by the legislation.
The result of the case should make judicial review necessary in
fewer cases since the complaint procedures should resolve many
disputes. Where they do not, the courts will at least have the benefit
of the agency's views. The courts will also be free to conduct limited
inquiries into whether the UMTA acted within the proper scope of
96. 537 F.2d at 948.
97. Id. at 949.
98. Id.
99. 49 C.F.R. § 605.35 (1976), allows for judicial review of final administrative action
under the procedures.
100. 537 F.2d at 949. The Supreme Court, in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970)
suggested that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction might apply when the federal agencies
have a formal complaint process. The Court stated: "[plaintiffs] do not seek review of an
administrative order, nor could they have obtained an administrative ruling since HEW has
no procedure whereby welfare recipients may trigger and participate in the Department's
review of state welfare programs." Id. at 406.
101. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
102. See notes 33, 52 supra and accompanying text.
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its authority. They will be able to determine whether the agency
discretion was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, and more im-
portantly to complaining parties, whether an agency has observed
the applicable procedural requirements to protect a plaintiff under
the Act.
Terry L. Barnich
